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Abstract
Relations are established between information sharing (IS) situations and IS–games on one
hand and information collecting (IC) situations and IC–games on the other hand. It is shown
that IC–games can be obtained as convex combinations of so-called local games. Properties
are described which IC–games possess if all related local games have the respective properties.
Special attention is paid to the classes of convex IC–games and of k–concave IC–games. This
last class turns out to consist of total big boss games. For the class of total big boss games a new
solutionconcept is introduced: bi–monotonicallocation schemes.
Journal of Economic Literature ClassiﬁcationNumber: C71, D89
Keywords: cooperative games, information, big boss games, bi-monotonicallocation scheme.
1 Faculty of ComputerScience, "Al.I. Cuza" University, 16BerthelotSt., 6600Ias ¸i, Romania. Thisauthor
acknowledges ﬁnancial support from CentER, Tilburg University.
2 CentER and Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The
Netherlands.
3 Correspondingauthor. E-mail address: j.b.timmer@kub.nl. This authoracknowledges ﬁnancial support
from the Netherlands Organization for scientiﬁc research (NWO) through project 613–304–059.
11 Introduction
In Brˆ anzei, Tijs and Timmer (2000) information collecting (IC) situations and corresponding IC–
games were introduced. They modelled situationswhere an action taker in an uncertain situationcan
improve his action choices by gathering information from players more informed about the situation.
The problem of sharing the gains, when cooperating with informants, is tackled by constructing the
correspondingIC–game and consideringsolutionsdeveloped for such games.
In Slikker, Norde, and Tijs (2000) information sharing (IS) situations were introduced and cor-
responding IS–games. They modelled situations where all players are action takers in an uncertain
situationand where they can gain by sharing their information about the situation.
It turned out that the family of 0–normalized IC–games for a ﬁxed action taker and ﬁxed player
set coincides with the cone of 0–normalized monotonicgames where the action taker is a veto player
(cf. Theorem 3.5 in Brˆ anzei et al. (2000)). In Slikker et al. (2000) it was proved that the class of
information sharing games coincides with the class of cooperative games for which a population
monotonicallocation scheme exists.
In Section 2 of this paper we study relations between IC–situations and IS–situations and the
corresponding games. We show that an n-person IS–game can be seen as the sum of n IC–games.
Further we introduce local games corresponding to IC–situations and show that an IC–game is a
suitableconvex combinationof the localgames. Properties as convexityand k-concavityfor the local
games are inherited by the IC–games. For k–symmetric games a geometric method is described to
discoverwhetherthegameis k-concave, convex ornoneofthem. InSection3specialattentionispaid
to total big boss games and bi–monotonic allocation schemes. It turns out that k-concave IC–games
are total big boss games.
2 Informationcollectingand informationsharing situations and games
We start with recalling (and modifying a bit) the notions IC–situation, IC–game, IS–situation and
IS–game introduced in Brˆ anzei et al. (2000) and Slikker et al. (2000).
An IC–situationis a tuple
<N;k;A k;(Ω;);fIi j i 2 Ng;r k>
Here N = f1;2;:::;ng, Ak and Ω are non–empty ﬁnite sets, k 2 N,  is a positive probability
distributiononΩ (i.e. (!) > 0 for all ! 2 Ω and
P
!2Ω (!)=1 ) :For each i 2 N, Ii is a partition
of Ω and rk :ΩA k−! IR is a real valued function on Ω Ak:
The set N is called the set of players, player k 2 N is the action taker, Ω is the set of possible
states (relevant for the action taker),  is the prior probability distribution and Ii is the information
partition of player i. Such an IC–situation corresponds to the following decision problem for player
k. He has tochoose an action ak from his actionset Ak, under uncertaintyof the true state, leadingto
ar e w a r dr k( !;ak) if ! is the true state. Before choosing his action he can collect information from
2all otherplayers or a subset of players (where monetary compensationsfor delivering informationcan


















Here IS is the partition of Ω consistingof the non–empty sets of the form \i2SJi; where Ji 2I ifor
all i 2 S: If we also deﬁne
(2) vk(S)=0for all S  N nf kg
we obtain the cooperative game <N ;v k>which we call the IC-game corresponding to the above
IC-situation.
Example 1. (Catch the monster; one trial) Consider the IC-situation
<N;k;A k;(Ω;);fIi j i 2 Ng;r k>
where N = f1;2;3;4g;k=4 ,Ω=A 4=f 0 ; 1 g 3 ; ( ! )=1 = 8for each ! 2 Ω, I4 = fΩg;
Ii = ffx 2 Ω j xi =0 g ;f x2Ωjx i=1 gg for i 2f 1 ;2 ;3 g ;r 4(!;a) = 160 if ! = a; r4(!;a)=0
otherwise.
This corresponds to a situation of an apartment with eight rooms, 000, 100, 010, 001, 110, 101,
011, and 111, where in one of the rooms a monster is hidden. Player 4 has to choose one room and
if the monster is in that room he obtains a reward of 160; otherwise there is no reward. He can make
use of the information of players 1,2,3 or not. Player i 2f 1 ;2 ;3 gknows the i-th coordinate of the
room number. One can calculate the correspondingIC-game <N ;v>and obtainsN = f1;2;3;4g,
v(S)=0for all S  N with 4 = 2 S, v(f4g)=2 0 ;v( f 4 ;ig)=40for i 2f 1 ;2 ;3 g ,v ( f 4 ;i;jg)=80
if i;j 2f 1 ;2 ;3 gand i 6= j,a n dv( N) = 160:
Example 2. (Catch the monster; three trials) Take the situation as in Example 1 and modify it in
such a way that player 4 can look in three rooms. This leads to the IC-situation
<N;4;A 0
4;(Ω;);fIi j i 2 Ng;r 0
4>
where A0
4 = fK  Ω jj Kj=3 g ;r 0
4( !;K) = 160 if ! 2 K;r0
4(!;K)=0otherwise. This leads to
the IC-game <N ;v 0>with v0(S)=0if 4 = 2 S, v0(f4g)=6 0 ;v 0( f i;4g) = 120 for i 2f 1 ;2 ;3 g
and v0(S) = 160 if jSj3and 4 2 S:
Note that <N ;v>and <N ; v 0>in Examples 1 and 2 are monotonic games with 4 as veto
player.
3An IS-situation is a tuple
<N;fAi ji2Ng;(Ω;);fIi j i 2 Ng;fri j i 2 Ng>:
Here N;Ω;,a n dI ihave the same meaning as earlier. For each player i 2 N there is now a
non-empty ﬁnite action set Ai and a reward function ri :ΩA i−! IR : Each player i 2 N has to
choose an action ai 2 Ai and obtains then a reward ri(!;ai) depending on the chosen action and the
true state !.
If a group S of players decides to cooperate and share their information, then the total expected











This leads to the IS-game <N ;v>where v(S) i sg i v e nb y( 3 ) .
What to say about relations between IC-situationsand IS-situations?
(i) Suppose we have an IC-situation < N;k;A 
k;(Ω;);fIi j i 2 Ng;r 
k > l e a d i n gt ot h e
IC-game vk: Then this game is also the IS-game correspondingto the IS-situation
<N;fAi ji2Ng;(Ω;);fIi j i 2 Ng;fri j i 2 Ng>
where Ai = A
k if i = k, Ai is an arbitrary non-empty ﬁnite set for i 6= k, ri = r
k if i = k and ri =0
if i 2 N nfkg:
So an IC-situationwith k as action taker can be transformed into an IS-situation, where all action
takers except k have a trivial reward function, the zero–function.
(ii) Suppose we have an IS-situation
<N;fAi ji2Ng;(Ω;);fIi j i 2 Ng;fri j i 2 Ng>
with correspondingIS-game v.
Consider the n IC-situations
<N;k;A k;<Ω;>;fIi j i 2 Ng;r k>for k 2 N
with corresponding IC-games v1;v 2;:::;vk;:::;vn: Then it follows from (1), (2) and (3) that v =
P
i2N vi. So an IS-situation can be decomposed in n IC-situations and the IS-game is the sum of the
n IC-games v1;v 2;:::;vn,w h e r ev kisa monotonick-veto game. In Slikkeret al. (2000)itwasproved
that an IS-game is a game with a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) (cf. Sprumont






vi(S)=v ( S )and
ai;S  ai;T for all i 2 S  T
4because vi is a monotonicgame.
Example 3. (Avoid or catch) Consider the IS-situation
<N;(Ω;);fA i;I i;r iji2Ng>
with N = f1;2g;A 1 =A 2 =Ω=f 0 ;1 g 2 ; (0;0) = 1=10, (0;1) = (1;0) = (1;1) = 3=10.
Further I1 = ff00;01g;f10;11gg;I2 = ff00;10g;f01;11ggand
r1(a;!) = 20(ja1 − !1j + ja2 − !2j) for all a =( a 1;a 2)2A 1;!2Ω ;
r 2 ( a;!)=4 0−10(ja1 − !1j + ja2 − !2j) for all a =( a 1;a 2)2A 2;!2Ω :
Onecan thinkofthefollowingsituation. Inanapartmentwithfourrooms00, 01,10and11, amonster
is hidden. The probability that the monster is in 00 is 1/10 and the probability that the monster is
in one of the other rooms is 3/10. The players 1 and 2 have to visit a room. Player 1 likes a room
as far away from the monster as possible, while player 2 likes a room as near as possible. Player 1
knowswhether the monster is at the north side N = f00;01gor not, and player 2 knowswhether the
monster is at the west side W = f00;10gor not.
The correspondingIS-game <N ;v>isthesumof thetwoIC-games <N ;v 1>and <N ;v 2> ,
where N = f1;2g
v1(f1g)=3 2 ;v 1 ( f 2 g )=0 v 1( f 1 ;2 g )=4 0
v 2( f 1 g )=0 ;v 2 ( f 2 g )=3 6 v 2( f 1 ;2 g )=4 0 :
A populationmonotonicallocation scheme for <N ;v>is
f1gf 2 gf 1 ; 2 g
1 d v 1 ( f 1 g )  v 1 ( f 1 ; 2 g ) e
2 b  v 2 ( f 2 g ) v 2 ( f 1 ; 2 g ) c
= d 32  40 e
b  36 40 c
Now we introduce local games v! :2 N−! IR for each ! 2 Ω, given an information collecting
situation
ICk =<N;k;A k;(Ω;);fIi j i 2 Ng;r k>:
The game <N;v!>is deﬁned by v!(S)=0if k= 2S ,a n df o rk2S:





where IS(!) is that atom in IS containing !. The number v!(S) can be interpreted as the best
expected reward for coalition S if ! is the true state. In that case S knows that the true state is one of
the elements in IS(!) and each !0 2 IS(!) has conditionalprobability
((IS(!)))−1(!0):




















 ( ! ) v !( S) :
Also for S 63 k we have v(S)=0=
X
! 2 Ω
 ( ! ) v !( S) :So we have proved
Proposition 1. If <N ;v>is the IC-game correspondingto an informationcollectingsituation ICk





Ag a m e<N ;v>which is monotonicand has k as veto player is called k–concave if
(CCk) v(S)−v(S nfig)v(T)−v(Tnfig)
for all i 2 N; and S;T 2 2N with i;k 2 S  T and k-convex if the reverse inequality holds:
(CVk) v(S)−v(S nf i g )v( T)−v( Tnf i g ) :
Notethatk-convexgamesareconvexgames(cf.Shapley(1971))andhavemanyinterestingproperties.
A special section, section 3, will be devoted to k-concave IC-games.
Proposition 2. (Inheritance property) Suppose the local games v! of an IC-situation are all k-
concave (convex), then the correspondingIC-game v is k-concave (convex).
Proof. We prove only that v is k-concave, given that all local games are k-concave. It follows from
Proposition1 that for all i;S;T with i;k2S  T :




 ( !)(v!(S)− v!(S nf i g )−v !( T)+v !( Tnf i g ))  0
where the inequalityfollows from the fact that the local games v! are k-concave and (!) > 0:
Example 4. (Treasure guessing) Consider the IC-situation <N;k;A k;(Ω;);fIi j i 2 Ng;r k >
whereN = f1;2;3g;k=3 ,A 3=f n;ga;g b;g c;g dg,Ω=f a;b;c;dgand (!)=1 = 4forall ! 2 Ω:
Further I1 = ffa;bg;fc;dgg,I2 = ffa;b;cg;fdgg,I3 = fΩg; and rk(!;n)=0for all ! 2 Ω;
rk(!;gx)=4 0if ! = x and rk(!;gx)=− 60 otherwise.
One can think of a situation where a treasure with a value of 40 dollars is hidden in one of the places
a;b;c;d(equalpriorprobabilities). Player 3can guesswhere thetreasureis, andifhe guessesrighthe
6obtainsthetreasure. If he guesseswronghehastopay60dollars. Anotheractionforplayer3 isnotto
guess (n) with resulting reward 0. It only makes sense to guess if player 3 knows where the treasure
is. This implies that for the local games we have va = vb =0 ,v c ( f 1 ;2 ;3 g )=4 0and vc(S)=0
otherwise, vd(f2;3g)=v d( f 1 ;2 ;3 g )=40and vd(S)=0otherwise. These local games are convex,
so the IC-game v is also convex by Proposition 2 and v =( v a+v b+v c+v d) = 4 ;v ( f 2 ;3 g )=1 0 ;
v ( f 1 ;2 ;3 g )=20;v ( S)=0otherwise.
For the special class of k-symmetric IC-games we can discover whether the game is convex, k-
concave or noneof them by lookingat the graph of the so-calleddetectionfunctionas the proposition
below shows.
L e tu sc a l lag a m ev2MVk (i.e. v is monotonic and k is a veto player) k-symmetric if
v(S)=v ( T)for all S;T with k 2 S; k 2 T and jSj = jTj:
Corresponding to such a k-symmetric game v we construct the detection function B :[ 1 ;n]−! IR
as follows. Denote by br the value v(S) of a coalition S 3 k with jSj = r: Then B is deﬁned by
B(x)=( x−r ) b r +1 +( 1−x+r) b rfor x 2 [r;r +1 ]
where r 2f 1 ;2 ;:::;n− 1g: Note that the graph of B coincides with the broken line in IR 2 obtained
by connecting for r 2f 1 ;2 ;:::;n− 1g the points (r;br) and (r +1 ;b r+1) with a line segment.
Proposition 3. Let v 2 MVk be k-symmetric and let B be the corresponding detection function.
Then
(i) v is a convex game if and only if B is a convex function.
(ii) v is a k-concave game if and only if B is a concave function.
(iii) v satisﬁes the property
(Uk) v(N)− v(S) 
X
i2NnS
(v(N)− v(N nf i g )) for all S 3 k
if and only if the graph of B lies below the line in IR 2 through the points (n − 1;b n−1)and
(n;bn):
The proof of the propositionis left to the reader.
Knowingthat v 2 MVkisa convex game disclosesa lotofpropertiesof the solutionsof thegame
(cf. Shapley (1971)) for example, the Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953)) lies in the core of the game.
Also it is interestingto know whether v 2 MVk is k-concave as the followingsection shows.
Example 5.
(i) ConsideragainExample1. Thisleadstoa 4-symmetric game witha convex detectionfunction,
so the game is convex.
(ii) Consider Example 2 (Catch the monster; 3 trials). This leads to a 4-symmetric game with a
concave detection function, and so the game is 4-concave.
73 Total big boss games and bi–monotonic allocation schemes
In this section we pay attention to games <N ;v>with v 2 MVk that also satisfy the k-concavity
condition (CCk). A subclass of IC-games with k as action taker has this property. The k-concavity
condition says that for a player i the marginal contribution to a smaller coalition containing k is
(weakly) larger than the marginal contribution to a larger coalition containing k.T h e ﬁ r s t t h e o r e m
below shows that the class of games <N ; v>with v 2 MVk and v satisfying the k-concavity
condition, coincides with the class of total big boss games with k as big boss, which we introduce
now. Recall ﬁrst (cf. Muto et al. (1988) and Tijs (1990)) that a game <N ;v>is a big boss game
with k as big boss if v 2 MVk and if v has the property (Uk), mentioned in Proposition3.
L e tu sc a l lag a m e<N ;v>with v 2 MVk atotal big boss game with k as big boss, if the game
itself and each subgame <T ;v>containing k are big boss games. Stated otherwise, v 2 MVk is a





for all S;T containingk and S  T.H e r eM i ( T;v)=v( T)−v( Tnf i g ) :
Theorem 1. Let v 2 MVk.T h e n v is a total big boss game with k as big boss if and only if v is
k-concave.













i 2 Tn S
M i( T;v);
where the inequalityfollowsfrom (CCk)appliedh times. So k-concavity impliesthat v is a totalbig
boss game with k as big boss.
Suppose now that v is a total big boss game with k as big boss. First we prove that
(a) Mi(U;v)  Mi(U [f jg ;v)for all U 2 2N;i;j;k2Nwith
i;k 2 U  N nf jg :
By (TUk)we have
(b) v(U [f jg )−v( Unfig)M j(U[f jg ;v)+M i(U[f jg ;v).
On the other hand,
(c) v(U [fjg)−v(Unfig)=( v ( U[fjg)−v(U))+(v(U)−v(U nfig)) = Mj(U [fjg;v)+
M i(U;v):
8Then (a) follows directly from (b) and (c). To prove that v is k-concave take S;T 2 2N with
i;k 2 S  T and suppose that T n S = fi1;i 2;:::;ihg. Apply (a) h-times and we obtain
Mi(S;v)  Mi(S [f i 1g ;v)M i(S[f i 1;i 2g;v)M i(T;v):
So Mi(S;v)  Mi(T;v)which implies (CCk).
From Muto et al. (1988) itfollowsthat for a totalbig bossgame with k as big bosswe have for all
T 3 k:
(3.1) The core C(T;v)of the subgame <T;v>is equal to
fx 2 IR T j 0  x i  M i(T;v)for all i 2 T nf kg ;
P
i 2 Tx i=v( T) g
(3.2) The -value (T;v)(cf. Tijs (1981)) and the nucleolus Nu(T;v)(cf. Schmeidler (1969)) of
<T;v>coincide and are equal to the center z of the core C(T;v)where zi = Mi(T;v)=2for
all i 2 T nf kgand zk = v(T) −
P
i2TnfkgMi(T;v)=2.
Take <N ;v>in MVk and denote by Pk the set fS  N j k 2 Sg: Call a scheme [bi;S]i2S;S2Pk an
allocation scheme if each column [bi;S]i2S corresponds to a core element of the subgame <S ;v> .
We call such an allocation scheme [bi;S]i2S;S2Pk a bi–monotonic allocation scheme (bi–mas) if
for all S;T 2 Pk with S  T we have bi;S  bi;T for all i 2 S nf k g ;and bk;S  bk;T: In a bi–mas
the big boss is better off in larger coalitions, and the other players are worse off.
Let [bi;S]i2S;S2Pk be deﬁned by bk;S = v(S) and bi;S =0if i 2 S nf kg .T h e n[ b i;S]i2S;S2Pk is
ab i – m a sf o r<N ;v> . So each v 2 MVk has a bi–mas. The next theorem shows that a total big
boss game has many bi–monotonic allocation schemes. This theorem is comparable to a result by
Sprumont (1990) which tells that for a convex game each core element is extendable to a population
monotonicallocationscheme. We say thata bi–mas [bi;S]i2S;S2Pk is an extensionof the core element
x 2 C(N;v)if xi = bi;N for all i 2 N.
Theorem 2. Let <N ;v>be a total big boss game with k as big boss and let x 2 C(N;v).T h e nx
is extendable to a bi–monotonicallocationscheme.
Proof. Since x 2 C(N;v), by (3.1), we can ﬁnd for each i 2 N nf k gan i 2 [0;1], such that





We will show that [bi;S]i2S;S2Pk,d e ﬁ n e db yb i;S = iMi(S;v) for all (i;S) with i 2 S nf k gand
bk;S = v(S)−
P
i2SnfkgiMi(S;v), is a bi–mas. Then it is an extension of x.
Take S;T 2 Pk with S  T and i 2 S nf kg :We have to prove that bi;S  bi;T and bk;S  bk;T.
First, bi;S = iMi(S;v)  iMi(T;v)=b i;T, where the inequalityfollows from the k-concavity of












=( v ( S ) −
X
















where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (TUk), the second inequality from the k-concavity and the
third inequalityfrom the monotonicityof the total big boss game <N ;v> .S ob k;T  bk;S:
Example6. ConsideragaintheIC-game inExample2. Thisgame<N ;v 0>isa totalbigbossgame.
A bi–mas, consisting in each column S of the -value of <S ;v 0>(see (3.2): bi;S = Mi(S;v0)=2 is
given by
f4gf 1 ; 4 gf 2 ; 4 gf 3 ; 4 gf 1 ; 2 ; 4 gf 1 ; 3 ; 4 gf 2 ; 3 ; 4 gf 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 g
1d  30  20 20  0 e
2 j  30  20  20 0 j
3 j   30  20 20 0 j
4 b 60 90 90 90 120 120 120 160 c
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